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ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE: A NEW PROPOSAL
FOR ELIGIBILITY
In order to counter possible injury to domestic industry caused
by tariff concessions, a program of adjustment assistance was formulated
as part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.2 This program offered
an alternative to the more drastic "escape clause"" provisions for re-
voking tariff concessions. Adjustment assistance was designed to mitigate
the dislocating effects of increased imports by providing the injured
firm with financial, 4 tax,' and technical 6 assistance to enable it to
adjust to foreign competition,7 hopefully by a reallocation of resources
to an industry in which it would have a comparative advantage8 over
I Adjustment assistance is a program designed to mitigate the effects of increased
competition from imports brought about by tariff concessions. Tariff concessions promote
free trade but can be injurious to the domestic producers of competing products. By aid-
ing injured firms and their unemployed workers in readjusting to the new competitive
situation, adjustment assistance can help the advance toward free trade. See Note, Adjust-
ment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: A Will-O'-the-Wisp, 33 GEol
WAsH. L. REv. 1088, 1088-89 (1965).
2 Title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA) §§ 301-61, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901-91
(1964).
8 The first "escape clause" enactment, passed as part of the Trade Agreements Ex-
tension Act of 1951, empowered the Tariff Commission to conduct investigations on the
application of any interested party to determine whether, as a result in whole or in part
of trade concessions, a product was being imported "in such increased quantities . . . as
to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry. .. ." Trade Agreements Ex-
tension Act of 1951, ch. 141, § 7(a), 65 Stat. 74. If the Commission felt the statutory
criteria were met, it recommended to the President that the United States in effect "escape"
from its prior trade concession by increasing the tariff or instituting a quota to alleviate
the injury.
The "escape clause" was retained in modified form in the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. Under the TEA a petitioning industry must sustain the burden of proving that the
increased imports were caused in major part by tariff concessions and that they were the
major factor in causing serious injury to the industry. TEA §§ 301(b)(1), (3), 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1901(b)(1), (3) (1964).
4 TEA §§ 314-16, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1914-16 (1964).
5 Id. § 317, 19 U.S.C. § 1917.
6 Id. § 313, 19 US.C. § 1913.
7 Secretary of Commerce Hodges, in his testimony before the House Ways and Means
Committee, said:
As the President stated in his message, "the accent is on adjustment," not on
assistance. Firms will have to come up with reasonable development plans before
they can qualify for loans under the program. And workers will have to be
willing to try new jobs, or perhaps even move to new homes.
Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 6, at 3779-80 (1962) (emphasis in original).
8 Samuelson explains the principle of comparative advantage as follows:
Whether or not one of two regions is absolutely more efficient in the production
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imported products. In addition, adjustment assistance was to be avail-
able for workers who had lost their jobs due to the effects of foreign
competition on their employers. 9
The Tariff Commission's original implementation of the program,
however, failed to alleviate the effects of dislocation. Recent efforts
to revitalize adjustment assistance have undermined the previous
justification for the program in favor of easily implemented formu-
lations. A new approach to adjustment assistance is needed-one that
is not only workable, but also justifiable.
I
THE POLICIES BEHIND ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
Three major policies underlie the program of adjustment as-
sistance. First, it was realized that escape clause relief inhibited United
States free trade policy.10 Second, escape clause relief protected an
entire industry, even though only some of the firms in the industry
were injured. It also hurt the consumer, who was forced to pay higher
prices because less expensive foreign goods were kept out.1 Adjustment
assistance offered the advantage of allowing the benefits of free trade
to inure to the consumer, while helping those injured by such imports
to reallocate their resources to areas in which they could compete.
Finally, since the government was responsible for negotiating tariff re-
ductions, it had some obligation to assist firms and workers harmed by
such reductions. 12
of every good than is the other, if each specializes in the products in which
it has a comparative advantage (greatest relative efficiency), trade will be
mutually profitable to both regions. Real wages of productive factors will rise
in both places.
P. SAMUTEsoN, ECONOMics 651 (7th ed. 1967) (emphasis in original).
9 Such workers may be eligible for special trade readjustment allowances and
retraining programs. TEA §§ 321-38, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1931-78 (1964). A worker's petition for
eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance may be filed pursuant to id. § 301(c)(2), 19
U.S.C. § 1901(c)(2).
10 As trade policy became more and more intermingled with foreign policy,
tariff adjustment became an inappropriate means of protecting domestic
industry. The possibility that a negotiated trade concession might be negated-in
whole or part-by a Presidential proclamation limited the authority of the tariff
negotiators.
Comment, "In Major Part"--The New Causation Problem in the Trade-Agreements
Program, 44 TExAs L. REv. 1331, 1332 (1966).
11 See the President's message transmitting the Administration's trade bill, in H.R.
Doc. No. 314, in 2 U.S.C.C. & A.N., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4089 (1962).
12 Id. at 4092.
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II
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY CRTERIA
For a firm13 to be eligible for adjustment assistance it must show
that: (1) imports are increasing; 14 (2) the increase in imports results
in major part from concessions granted under trade agreements; 15
(3) the firm is seriously injured or threatened with serious injury;16
and (4) increased imports have been the major factor in causing or
threatening to cause such injury.'1 From the enactment of the Trade
Expansion Act in 1962 until November 1969, no petition for adjust-
ment assistance succeeded.18 The hurdles presented by these criteria
became impossible to overcome because of the strict interpretation
the Tariff Commission gave to the term "major." In deciding if in-
creased imports had been a result "in major part" of trade concessions,
the Commission tried to determine whether trade concessions ac-
counted for the increase in imports more than all other causes com-
bined.19 In addition, the Commission did not take an aggregate view
of trade concessions.2 0 Rather, it looked for the immediate impact of
a concession on imports; if no such impact was observed soon after the
concession had been granted, it was assumed that the lower tariff had
become a condition of trade and could no longer be termed a cause
13 The same statutory criteria apply to an industry seeking tariff relief (TEA
§§ 301(a)(1), (b)(1)-(3), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901(a)(1), (b)(l)-(3) (1964)) and to workers seeking
adjustment assistance. Id. §§ 301(c)(2)-(3), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901(c)(2)-(3).
14 Id. § 301(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1901(c)(1).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. § 301(c)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 1901(c)(3).
18 "[N]ever in thirteen industry investigations, seven firm investigations, nor six
worker investigations had the Commission made an affirmative determination of eligibility
for tariff adjustment or adjustment assistance . . .." Transmission Towers & Parts,
TEA-W-9 & 10, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 298, at 15 (Nov. 3, 1969) (dissenting opinion).
19 National Tile & Mfg. Co., TEA-F-5, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 145, at 11-12 (Dec.
21, 1964).
20 In Softwood Lumber, TEA-I-4, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 79 (Feb. 14, 1963), the
Commission observed that "maximum stimulation of imports attributable to a reduction
in duty generally occurs directly or shortly after the reduced rates come into effect." Id.
at 10. See Umbrellas & Parts of Umbrellas, TEA-I-6, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 136, at 4
(Sept. 1, 1964).
The Commission may have been acting in a logical manner, but apparently in disregard
of the legislative intent:
The phrase "as a result of concessions granted under trade agreements", as
applied to concessions involving reductions in duty, means the aggregate reduction
which has been arrived at by means of a trade agreement or trade agreements ....
H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1962); see S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1962).
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of increased imports.21 The Commission also tended to discount the
relevance of tariff concessions negotiated before a petitioning firm
was in operation, 22 further limiting the likelihood of a successful show-
ing that increased imports had resulted "in major part" from tariff
concessions.23
Similar obstacles were presented by the Commission's approach
to determining whether increased imports were the "major factor"
in causing or threatening to cause serious injury. The Commission
claimed that if the sum of all causes other than increased imports was
the dominant cause of the injury, the petitioner had not met the stat-
utory test.24 It also rejected the notion that the "major factor" test had
been met when the increase in imports was the single most important
influence.25
III
REVISED STANDARDS FOR GRANTING ADJUSTMENT AS sIsTANCE
After seven years without an affirmative determination of eligi-
bility for adjustment assistance, the Commission recently modified
its causation analysis and found the statutory criteria satisfied in the
Buttweld Pipe and Transmission Towers cases.2 6 In order to find in-
jury, a majority of the Commission found the "in major part" and
"major factor" standards were satisfied by a "but for" test.
This interpretation of "major," originally rejected by the Com-
mission, had been foreshadowed in the concurring opinion of Com-
missioners Clubb and Thunberg in the Eyeglass Frames27 case, and
in the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Clubb in the Barbers'
Chairs28 case. In the latter, Clubb argued that the term "major" could
be given three interpretations; it could be defined as "larger than all
21 Barbers' Chairs, TEA-F-7, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 229, at 7-9 (Jan. 22, 1968);
Softwood Lumber, TEA-I-4, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 79, at 10 (Feb. 14, 1963).
22 See, e.g., Industrial Biochemicals, Inc., TEA-F-2, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 101, at
2-3 (July 23, 1963).
23 See Buttweld Pipe, TEA-W-8, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 297, at 18 (Nov. 3, 1969)
(dissenting opinion).
24 The Commission stated that the "major factor" is "not only.. . the one exerting
the greatest influence but also the one that dominates the overall result." National Tile &
Mfg. Co., TEA-F-5, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 145, at 7 (Dec. 21, 1964).
25 Id.
26 Transmission Towers & Parts, TEA-W-9 & 10, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 298 (Nov.
3, 1969); Buttweld Pipe, TEA-W-8, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 297 (Nov. 3, 1969).
27 TEA-I-10, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 219, at 14-16 (Oct. 6, 1967).
28 TEA-F-7, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 229, at 32-88 (Jan. 22, 1968).
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other [factors] combined," as "the largest single cause," or as any "sub-
stantial" factor. Clubb argued that "major" must be defined as meaning
"substantial" because it was the only definition that would give work-
able results.29 Thus, if trade concessions were a "substantial" cause of
increased imports and the imports were a "substantial" cause of in-
jury, the "major part" and "major factor" tests would be satisfied.
Later in the dissent he noted that a factor or cause would be substantial
if "but for" it the result would have been contrary.30
By implementing the "substantial" standard with a "but for" test,
a majority of the Commission found the petitioning parties eligible
for adjustment assistance in Buttweld Pipe and Transmission Towers.3 1
The Commission found that there had been an increase in imports
and went on to consider whether the increase had resulted "in major
part" from trade concessions; it asked, "but for the concessions, would
imports be substantially at their present level,"32 and determined that
the revised criteria had been met.
The "but for" test is a significant departure from the dominant
factor approach employed in the earlier Commission decisions. Under
this analysis, an increase in imports can be found to result "in major
part" from concessions whenever the concessions are, in effect, no more
than the "straw that breaks the camel's back"; 33 any necessary cause
may be termed a "major" one, even if it is only one of several minor
causes. Thus, the "major part" test has been distorted by the Commis-
sion in an effort to reach a workable formula.34
29 He rejected the definition of "major" as "larger than all [other factors] combined"
because it made the adjustment assistance program unworkable. Similarly, he rejected
defining "major" as "the largest single cause" because such a standard was neither
practical nor predictable; there was no realistic way of deciding whether certain factors
constituted an aggregate cause or were merely separate causes. Clubb said:
[D]etermining whether a group of factors should be lumped together as one
cause which is 50% responsible for increased imports, or whether they should be
split up into five separate causes, each 10%0 responsible, is a process which cannot
be done on any but a capricious and whimsical basis. It seems unlikely that
Congress would make the right to relief depend upon such metaphysical non-
sense .... Accordingly, it seems dear that the "largest single cause" interpretation
should be ruled out because it is not practical.
Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
30 Id. at 38.
81 Note 26 supra.
82 Buttweld Pipe, TEA-W-8, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 297, at 10 (Nov. 3, 1969).
33 National Tile & Mfg. Co., TEA-F-5, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 145, at 8 n.1 (Dec. 21,
1964).
84 In a given case, the dominant cause of increased imports might be the poor
quality or design of the domestic product, or high monopolistic prices charged by the
domestic firm. Under the "but for" test, however, increased imports could be found to
be the result "in major part" of tariff concessions if such concessions had contributed in
some degree to the increase in imports.
1970] 1053
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Commission has also shifted its view as to what trade conces-
sions will be considered causes of increased imports.3 5 The present ma-
jority of the Commission holds that in determining whether increased
imports have been caused "in major part" by trade concessions, the term
"concessions granted under trade agreements"3 6 means the aggregate
of all concessions that have been granted.37 The Commission considers
the cumulative total of reductions made for the product in question
and determines whether the total reduction is a substantial part of the
price differential between the lower priced import and the higher priced
domestic product.38 This new interpretation facilitates a finding that
increased imports have been the result "in major part" of tariff conces-
sions.
The Commission also employs the "but for" test in determining
whether the increased imports have been the "major factor" in causing
or threatening to cause serious injury to the firm or the unemployment
of workers.3 9 In the recent cases in which the Commission has used the
"but for" test, it has glossed over the "major factor" question, making
the perfunctory statement that the injury would not have occurred "but
for" the increased imports.40 If there is a showing of increased imports
caused "in major part" by tariff concessions, and injury is established,
the "major factor" requirement would seem to present little difficulty
in proving eligibility for adjustment assistance.
IV
TOWARDS A NEW POLICY FOR ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
Although the new tests applied by the Commission yielded affirma-
tive findings on petitions for adjustment assistance, the revised interpre-
35 See text at notes 19-20 supra.
36 TEA § 301(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1901(c)(1) (1964).
37 See H.R. REP. No. 1818, supra note 20, at 46; S. REP. No. 2059, supra note 20, at 20.
The tariff concessions to be taken into account are those which have been arrived at
by means of trade agreements entered into pursuant to the TEA § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 1821
(1964), or the Tariff Act of 1930, § 350, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1964). H.R. REP. No. 1818, supra
note 20, at 46; S. REP'. No. 2059, supra note 20, at 20.
38 For example, in the Buttweld Pipe case, the aggregate of tariff concessions totalled
9%, and imported pipe was selling for between 11o and 15%o less than domestically
produced pipe. Thus, the majority of the Commission believed that "except for the
concessions, imports could not have reached substantially the level they have and, there-
fore, within the meaning of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 the increased imports are a
result in major part of the tariff concessions." Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 297, at 11. That
the last significant concession was granted before 1948 and that the mill was not
constructed until the early 1960's were not considered relevant.
39 See, e.g., Transmission Towers & Parts, TEA-W-9 & 10, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No.
298, at 13 (Nov. 3, 1969); Buttweld Pipe, TEA-W-8, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 297, at 12
(Nov. 3, 1969).
40 Cases cited in note 39 supra.
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tations of "in major part" and "major factor" run counter to the aims
of the adjustment assistance program. Assistance may now be granted
whether or not tariff concessions and foreign competition are the real
causes of domestic injury. The argument that adjustment assistance is
an indefensible preference to firms and workers that happen to have
some relationship to foreign competition is again valid.41
A. Adjustment Assistance and the Proposed Trade Act of 1969
In an effort to solve the problems in the adjustment assistance pro-
gram formulated under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, President
Nixon in his proposed Trade Act of 1969 has offered new standards for
determining eligibility for adjustment assistance.42 This bill was formu-
lated prior to the Commission's affirmative findings of eligibility under
the 1962 Act and was meant to remedy the strict interpretations of "in
major part" and "major factor" then employed by the Tariff Commis-
sion.43
The proposal attempts to promote a trend towards adjustment as-
sistance by making the statutory test for adjustment assistance easier to
meet than the corresponding test for escape clause relief. It would grant
adjustment assistance when increased imports are found to be "a sub-
stantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof," 44 and grant
tariff relief only when increased imports are "the primary cause of
serious injury, or the threat thereof." 45 It eliminates the requirement
that the increased imports must be caused "in major part" by tariff
concessions. Tariff relief or adjustment assistance could therefore be
granted no matter what the cause of the increased imports.
By doing away with the causal relationship between tariff conces-
sions and increased imports, the Nixon bill negates one of the underly-
ing policy reasons for the adjustment assistance program.4 6 When the
41 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.C. & A.N., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3143-44 (1962).
42 President Nixon's proposals concerning modification of the adjustment assistance
program are contained in H.R. 14870, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and are based on a
report to the President entitled FuTrur UNrrEn STATES FOEEtGN PoLucy, by William Roth,
the then Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. The report was transmitted to the
President on January 14, 1969, before the Tariff Commission had found any petitioners
eligible for adjustment assistance.
43 President Nixon, in a speech outlining the adjustment assistance proposal, said that
the present system "ha[s] not worked adequately." 115 CONG. RFC. H 10979 (daily ed.
Nov. 18, 1969).
44 H.R. 14870, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(f) (1969).
45 Id. § 301(d).
46 The bill also changes the roles of the Commission as fact finder and decision
maker. Under the present statute, the Tariff Commission performs these roles in both
tariff relief and adjustment assistance petitions. Under the Nixon proposal, the Commission
would continue to gather and supply the needed factual information in petitions for
either tariff relief or adjustment assistance, but determinations of eligibility to apply for
1055
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present adjustment assistance law was passed, it was believed that aid
to injured firms and workers could be justified because it would only
be given when the injury caused by increased foreign competition was
brought about by direct government action in reducing tariffs.47 If the
causal requirement is eliminated, this policy basis is no longer present,
and a new governmental policy must be defined.
Absent a showing that tariff concessions caused the increased im-
ports, the only policy justification for adjustment assistance under the
Nixon proposal is that the government has an obligation to aid any
party injured by imports. Consequently, the other policy reasons behind
adjustment assistance-that it is a method of aiding injuried parties
without hurting the United States policy of fostering freer trade, and
that it offers a more precise method of aid than escape clause relief-
must be reconsidered.
Adjustment assistance should be given more easily than tariff relief
because the former has virtually no adverse effect on overall United
States foreign trade policy, but such aid should only be given when it
enhances foreign trade policy. Granting adjustment assistance any time
a petitioning party is injured by imports gives an unwarranted prefer-
ence to such parties, for it discriminates against like firms that happen
to be injured by domestic, rather than foreign, competition.48
The only defensible policy foundation for adjustment assistance
when no causal connection between increased imports and tariff con-
adjustment assistance would be made by the President, with the Commission continuing
to decide questions of tariff relief. See id. § 301(b).
There is an inherent inconsistency in the Nixon formulation. The Commission would
be applying the "primary cause" test for tariff relief, and the President (or a board to
which he delegated his authority) would be applying the less strict "substantial factor"
test. In applying these tests each board might develop its own method of analysis for
making determinations, and an application that is denied eligibility for adjustment
assistance could be granted tariff relief under the supposedly stricter "primary cause"
test due to inconsistent standards. (It should be noted that, if the Commission makes a
positive determination for tariff relief, the President may furnish such relief or provide
that the firms and workers in the industry may apply for adjustment assistance.)
47 Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 4, at 1718 (1962).
48 The past Chairman of the Tariff Commission, Stanley Metzger, believes that
special preferences for industries and firms injured by imports are justified regardless of
the policy behind the aid. He argues:
Special adjustment assistance, while creating a differential in favor of import-
displaced workers . . . may serve the purpose in time of raising the levels of
adjustment assistance available generally, through higher benefits in state
unemployment compensation systems and in federal programs . . perhaps just in
order to eliminate the favoritism evidenced by such special assistance to import-
displaced workersi
S. MErzaxa, TADE AGREEMENTs AND TH KENNEDY RouND 56 (1964).
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cessions is required would rest directly on economic grounds. In terms
of international free trade theory, it makes better economic sense to
help firms adjust to imports by reallocating their resources to areas in
which they have a comparative advantage over imported goods than to
raise tariffs to keep out low-priced foreign goods.
B. An Alternative Proposal
It is reasonable to grant adjustment assistance when concessions
have caused the injury, for then there is a compensating justification
for giving aid. Under such a program, aid would not be given if it
were, for example, shoddy domestic workmanship or poor domestic
sales strategy that caused imports to increase.49 Thus, the present system
is grounded on a logical policy basis. However, it has been difficult to
establish the necessary causal relationship between increased imports
and tariff concessions. Resort to a "but for" test has demonstrated that
in order to obtain workable results from the present statutory formula-
tion the underlying policy of the adjustment assistance program must
be distorted. The Nixon proposal offers only a partial solution to the
problem; it provides a manageable standard, but one devoid of a justifi-
able policy basis. It would apparently grant aid to any firm or group
of workers injured by increased imports, regardless of the cause of the
increase.
It may be that under the Nixon proposal adjustment assistance
would not be given to undeserving firms and would only be granted if
the domestic firm were at a comparative disadvantage vis-4-vis imported
goods. This result, which would logically fall within a policy of promot-
ing freer trade, could be achieved under the Nixon proposal by a find-
ing that increased imports are not a substantial factor in causing injury
if other factors are more substantial. However, such an interpretation
would, in effect, make the "substantial cause" test a "primary cause"
test, which does not appear to be the proposal's intent.50 In light of
the Commission's recent decision that the term "major" in the 1962
Act means "substantial" and its use of the "but for" test to find a "sub-
stantial" cause, a construction of the Nixon proposal to deny adjust-
ment assistance in a case where there is no comparative disadvantage
seems even less probable.
49 The increased imports would not have been the result in major part of the
trade concessions, but of the domestic problems of the firm. See, e.g., Barbers' Chairs,
TEA-F-7, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 229, at 4-6 (Jan. 22, 1968); cf. Ice Skates & Parts
Thereof, TEA-I-9, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 149, at 4 (Feb. 19, 1965).
50 The Nixon proposal reserves the "primary cause" test for determining eligibility
for tariff relief. I-I.R. 14870, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(d) (1969).
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A workable standard can be based on the policy of aiding free
trade by reallocating the resources of firms at a comparative disadvan-
tage with foreign competition. It might be attained by a provision that
adjustment assistance be granted only when increased imports are found
to be "a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof,"'r
and the injured firm does not have the potential to effectively compete
with such imports. Such a formulation would grant adjustment assis-
tance52 solely to firms and workers injured by an international phe-
nomenon-comparative disadvantage vis-4-vis foreign competitors.53 In
cases where the firm has the potential to successfully compete because
the foreign producer has no comparative advantage, there is little pur-
pose in granting aid; the injured firm is no different from one injured
by domestic competition.
This standard would have the advantage of not being tied to a
51 Id. § 301(f).
52 The same standard would be used for granting tariff relief, except the term
"substantial" would be replaced by "primary." This proposed modification of the Nixon
formula could be used in determinations of petitions for tariff relief as well as adjustment
assistance, to ensure that adjustment assistance would be more freely granted than tariff
relief. That result would be assured because the only difference between the two tests
would be the use of the more rigorous term "primary" in the tariff relief standard.
53 Under this proposal the Tariff Commission would first make a determination of
whether there was actual or potential serious injury to the petitioning firm or group of
workers. If the necessary injury had occurred, the Commission would next examine the
question of whether increased imports were a "substantial" cause of actual or potential
serious injury. The Commission might follow its recent interpretation and employ the
"but for" test in making the determination. This would not undermine the policy
behind the proposal because the petitioner would still have to overcome the comparative
advantage test, which would ensure that the underlying policy of the adjustment assistance
program was followed. If "substantial" cause were found, the Commission would deter-
mine whether the injured firm had the potential to effectively compete with such imports.
If it did not, the firm would be eligible to apply for adjustment assistance. The Tariff
Commission should not find this determination difficult to make because it has already
followed the practice of investigating the status of domestic producers. See, e.g., Trans-
mission Towers & Parts, TEA-W-9 & 10, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 298, at 37 (Nov. 3, 1969).
Under this proposal the Commission would compare the economic condition of the
firm with that of its domestic competitors of comparable size and product range. If the
Commission found the rest of the industry to be operating at an acceptable profit level,
there would be a rebuttable presumption that the petitioner did have the potential to
compete, in that it was not being injured by foreign firms with a comparative advantage.
It would then be up to the firm to rebut the presumption, by proving that it did not have
the potential to effectively compete with its foreign competitors because it was at a
comparative disadvantage. If a substantial part of the industry were not operating at an
acceptable profit level, the presumption would be in the petitioner's favor. The Commission
would then investigate the foreign industry to determine whether or not there were
significant differences between domestic and foreign costs of production. The Commission
has made similar investigations under 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1964). The relevant factors in
such an investigation are outlined in 19 C.F.R. §§ 202.2(c), 202.5 (1970).
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determination of whether trade concessions caused the increased im-
ports, and would more directly relate the adjustment assistance program
to the theory of reallocating the resources of firms at a comparative
disadvantage. By requiring a determination that the firm is at a com-
parative disadvantage, the problems of implementing the "substantial
cause" test through a "but for" formulation would be avoided. In addi-
tion, since the proposed formulation is based on the economic concept
of granting adjustment assistance to firms injured through their inabil-
ity to compete successfully with foreign industries, it does not suffer
from the defect of the Nixon proposal-aiding any firm injured by
increased imports.
Steven K. Weinberg
